An Economic Perspective on the Law of Excessive Profits Recovery by Zolt, Eric M. & Berkowitz, Jeffrey I.
An Economic Perspective on the Law of Excessive
Profits Recovery
American experience with the recovery of defense contractors'
excessive profits has been extensive. During this century, the United
States government has employed a variety of means to recover prof-
its it perceived as excessive, including: profit taxes, maximum profit
ceilings, and an approach under which contracts producing exces-
sive profits were renegotiated to return such profits to the Treasury.
The last of these-renegotiation of government contracts-has been
the prevailing approach for the past quarter century under the Re-
negotiation Act of 1951.1 Congress, however, has recently cut off
funds for the Renegotiation Board, the agency charged with admin-
istration of the Act, and has allowed the coverage of the Act to lapse.
As a result, long dormant profit ceilings imposed by the Vinson-
Trammell Act have come into force. 2
The merits of recovering excessive profits have been vigorously
debated.3 Much of the serious criticism has focused upon the seem-
ingly arbitrary and unpredictable manner in which the courts and
administrative agencies have approached the process of identifying
and measuring excessive profits.4 There has not emerged, however,
in either the courts or the commentary, a consistent legal and eco-
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1211-1231 (1970) as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. 33 1212(c)(1), 1213(f),
(i), 1215(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), 1216(a), 1218, 1218(a), 1222, 1224 (Supp. V 1975).
2 10 U.S.C. §§ 2382, 7300 (1976). These two sections, collectively known as the "Vinson-
Trammell Act," were originally enacted as section 3 of Act of Mar. 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
135, 48 Stat. 503.
3 For example, legal scholarship has dissected the rationale, see Coggeshall, Basic Princi-
ples of Renegotiation, in PROCUREMENT AND PROFIT RENEGOTIATION 43 (J.F. Weston ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as PRocuREmENTr]; Fensterstock, The Rationale of Renegotiation, 16 FED.
B.J. 87 (1956), the effect, see Christenson, Economic Implications of Renegotiation of Govern-
ment Contracts, 52 J. POLITICAL ECON. 48 (1944), the constitutionality, see Collier,
Constitutionality of Statutory Renegotiation, 10 LAw & CoNTEm. PRoas. 353 (1944); Page,
Renegotiation: Where We Are Now, 35 FED. B.J. 63 (1976); Sharp, Comments on Renegotia-
tion and the Constitution, 11 U. Cm. L. REv. 271 (1944), and the need for reform, see
Aronowitz, Report of the Committee on Claims Adjudication in Support of Recommendation
No. 22, in 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMNSTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 665, 674-83 (1970); Marcus, The Need for Standards in Renegotiation and Other
Determinations of Defense Profits, 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 23 (1963); Nichols, Equalizing
Profit and Loss in Renegotiation, 45 VA. L. REv. 41 (1959); Weston, Issues Developed by the
Conference, in PRocuREMENTr, supra, at 199; Note, Reform of the Renegotiation Process in
Government Contracting, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1141 (1970), of the renegotiation of excessive
profits, and analyzed the economics of renegotiation, see Bums, The Tax Court and Profit
Renegotiation, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 307 (1970).
See, e.g., Weston, Introduction and Statement of Issues, in PRocuREmT, supra note
3, at 1, 7-8.
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nomic analysis of excessive-profit recovery. The problems addressed
by this comment are both definitional and operational: a definition
of "excessive" profits must be articulated that is consistent with the
justification for profit recovery, and a consistent and practicable
way of measuring profits must be developed in order to apply this
concept once it is adequately defined. Although Congress has re-
cently eviscerated the Renegotiation Act, the concept of excessive-
profit recovery is not dead. The Vinson-Trammell Act remains in
force, and it is unlikely that Congress will entirely eliminate statu-
tory profit limitation of government defense contracts.' Indeed, the
uncertain future of this form of government economic regulation
makes it important to reexamine the economic rationale of
excessive-profits recovery and the recent performance of the courts
and agencies charged with recovering these profits.
I. HiSTORY, STRUCTURE, AND COVERAGE OF THE ACTS
Statutory regulation of profits from government defense con-
tracts has evolved through legislation enacted in wartime, peace-
time, and intermediate states of "national emergency." During the
First World War, Congress enacted an excessive-profits tax' to help
finance the increase in government expenditures and to capture
profits purportedly resulting from increased wartime demand.7 Con-
gress's next measure to restrict the profits of defense contractors was
the passage in 1934 of the Vinson-Trammell Act,8 which established
a fixed profit ceiling of 10 percent on naval and aircraft contracts.
In response to the sharply increased defense procurement demands
of World War I, Congress enacted a new excess-profits tax,9 sus-
pending temporarily the provisions of the Vinson-Trammell Act. '
This tax proved inadequate in controlling excessive defense expend-
itures, 1  however, and Congress replaced it first with the renegotia-
I An Undersecretary of Defense has noted that the Vinson-Trammell Act is obsolete and
should be repealed, yet it has been noted that "this could take years because many in
Congress would fight for a new law to regulate defense contractor profits." Wall St. J., Sept.
5, 1978, at 4, col. 2.
39 Stat. 1000 (1917) (expired 1921).
7 Adams, Excess Profits Tax, in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCmNc s 664 (1931).
1 Act of Mar. 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-135, § 3, 48 Stat. 503 (current version codified at
10 U.S.C. §§ 2382, 7300 (1976)).
Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-801, § 201, 54 Stat. 974 (repealed 1956).
,* Id. § 401.
" The tax had two shortcomings: first, it did not eliminate the "evils" of cost-plus
contracts which gave contractors no incentive to operate efficiently, and, second, it did not
eliminate disparities resulting from firms that could offset profits with disproportionately
high tax credits. See 17 TEMp. L.Q. 82, 82 (1942).
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tion provision of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appro-
priations Act of 1942,12 then with the Renegotiation Act of 1943.13
The major change of the 1943 Act was the replacement of contract-
by-contract renegotiation with an annual accounting and renegotia-
tion of defense contractors' profits.
Experience with the renegotiation concept during the war
proved highly successful;" this success ultimately led to the passage
of the Renegotiation Act of 195111 (the "Renegotiation Act"), which
again suspended, but did not repeal, the Vinson-Trammell Act."
The Renegotiation Act applied to contracts with specified agencies
and departments, 7 subject to exemptions based on amount of
sales," nature of product," and nature of contract.2 1 With the pas-
sage of the Renegotiation Act, Congress also created a new federal
agency, the Renegotiation Board, to administer and enforce the new
law.21 Specifically, the Renegotiation Board was assigned the task
of determining, in light of factors enumerated in the Act, what
portion, if any, of defense contractors' profits were "excessive. '"22
Firms subject to the Act were required to file reports with the Board
containing sales, profits, losses, and other financial data,2 which
were screened and subjected to accounting analysis to determine the
likelihood of the existence of excessive profits.24
'2 Ch. 247, § 403, 56 Stat. 245 (1942) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1191 (1970)).
13 Ch. 239, 57 Stat. 564 (1943) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1191 (1970)).
11 See 17 TEMP. L.Q. 82, 54 (1942).
" Ch. 15, 65 Stat. 7 (1951) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1211 (1970)).
' Id. § 102(d) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1212(e) (1970)).
'T The departments and agencies are listed at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1213(a) (1970). They
include: the Departments of Defense, Navy, Air Force, and Army, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission), and "any other agency of the Government exercising functions having a direct
and immediate connection with the national defense and which is designated by the President
during a national emergency proclaimed by the President, or declared by the Congress." Id.
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 1215(f)(1) (1970).
"Mandatory exemptions are provided for certain products. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. §
1216(a)(2) (1970) (agricultural products in their raw state).
" Permissive exemptions are provided for certain contracts. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. §
1216(d)(5) (1970) (contracts where separation of renegotiable and nonrenegotiable profits is
not administratively feasible).
21 Renegotiation Act of 1951, ch. 15, § 107, 65 Stat. 7 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 1217(a) (1970)). Since its creation in 1951 through fiscal year 1977, the Board required the
disgorgement of over $1.1 billion of profits deemed excessive. 22 RmEGOTATION BD. ANN. Rm.
12 (1977).
2 The factors are enumerated in 50 U.S.C. app. § 1213(e) (1970). See also 32 C.F.R. §
1460.8-.15 (1977) (regulations interpreting statutory factors).
3 50 U.S.C. app. § 1215(e)(1) (1970). See also 32 C.F.R. pt. 1470 (1977).
24 32 C.F.R. § 1471.1 (1977). Filings that reported profits that were clearly not excessive
were disposed of with the issuance of a notice of clearance, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1471.1, 1498.6(b)
(1977); otherwise filings were assigned to a regional renegotiation board for further examina-
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The coverage of the Renegotiation Act was limited to receipts
from contracts otherwise subject to the Act that were accrued or
received prior to the statute's "termination date." 5 The original
termination date of December 31, 1956, was consistently changed by
a series of amendments to extend the coverage of the Act through
September 30, 1976.21 Congress has failed, however, to revive the Act
since its coverage lapsed in 1976. Opinion in Congress exhibited a
full spectrum of positions on the continuing need for the Act: some
congressmen advocated repealing the Act altogether in peacetime,-
while others advanced President Carter's view that the authority of
the Renegotiation Board should be strengthened to "bear down hard
on excessive profits in government contracts. 28 Congress followed
neither approach; it failed to extend the Act and voted to terminate
funding for the Board.29
The recent action of Congress with respect to the Renegotiation
Act seemed to result not from close analysis of the propriety of
peacetime profit renegotiation,0 but rather from disillusionment
with the performance of the Renegotiation Board." The Board was
attacked for its increased spending and decreased efficiency in pro-
cessing cases and successfully recovering excessive profits.32 Al-
tion. Id. § 1471.1. In many cases the Board and the contractor were able to reach agreement
on the amount of excessive profits to be disgorged. See 22 RENEGOTATON BD. ANN. REP. 14
(1977) (83.2 percent). See also 32 C.F.R. pt. 1474 (1977) (agreement procedures). If no agree-
ments were reached, however, the Board issued a unilateral order determining the amount
of excessive profits, see 50 U.S.C. app. § 1215(a) (1970), which the contractor might then
challenge by filing a petition for de novo review in the Court of Claims. Id. § 1218 (Supp. V
1975) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 1218 (1970)).
25 50 U.S.C. app. § 1212(d)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
21 The amendments extending the coverage of the Act are set forth at 50 U.S.C. app. §
1212 note (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 H.R. 5257, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (a bill to provide that the Renegotiation Act
shall only be in effect during a period of national emergency).
u Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1978, at 4, col. 2. See, e.g., H.R. 4082, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
(a bill to revise and extend the Renegotiation Act).
n Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-431, tit. V, 92 Stat. 1021 (the Renegotiation Board
is funded only through March 31, 1979; all the Board's property is to be transferred to the
GSA upon cessation of the Board's activities or on March 31, 1979, whichever first occurs).
3 But see 123 CONG. Rnc. E1922 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1977) (remarks of Rep. McCloskey).
31 The House Report was highly critical of the Board: "The Committee feels that the
Board should be concentrating on the disposition of backlog, yet the record would indicate
that they have spent time re-writing regulations and practices even though the Renegotiation
Act has not been extended." H.R. Rep. No. 1253, 95th Cong., 2d Seass. 51 (1978). The Board
was, in addition, a victim of the congressional movement to cut back on the federal bureauc-
racy. See Letter from Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. to Colleagues (April 12, 1978)
("Would you like to abolish one federal agency before we adjourn?") (on file with The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law Review).
2 See Washington Post, July 9, 1978 ("We could have passed on an extension easy if that
board was a competent agency.") (quoting Representative Minish).
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though the Board no longer has authority to subject profits received
or accrued after September 30, 1976, to renegotiation, it has oper-
ated since the termination date in order to process its 1900-case
backlog. The recent House appropriations bill,-" by cutting off funds
to the Board after March 31, 1979, will allow the Board to dispose
of only a small fraction of cases that fall within the ambit of the Act.
As a result of the failure of Congress to extend the Renegotia-
tion Act, the Vinson-Trammell Act, which is enforced and adminis-
tered by the Internal Revenue Service, is currently in force with
respect to receipts and accruals attributable to performance of gov-
ernment contracts after September 30, 1976.11 The present version
of the Vinson-Trammell Act imposes profit ceilings of 10 percent
and 12 percent on contracts for the manufacture of all or part of any
naval vessel or aircraft, respectively, but excludes contractors whose
total receipts from such contracts are less than $10,000 per year."
The existing regulations under the Act, written in 1937,38 have been
described as "arcane," and the I.R.S. is in the process of drafting
new regulations. 7 While the precise content of these regulations is
still uncertain, it is apparent that contractors subject to the Act will
be required to file reports with the relevant military department and
remit to the Treasury any profits in excess of the statutory ceilings.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF ExcEsswVE PRoFrTS
It has been asserted that defense contracts are susceptible to
profiteering because the competitive market fails to confine indus-
try pricing to marginal cost.38 The argument attributes this failure
Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-431, tit. V, 92 Stat. 1021.
"The provisions of the Vinson-Trammell Act were suspended only so long as the Renego-
tiation Act was in effect. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1212(e) (1970).
10 U.S.C. §§ 2382(g)(2), 7300(g)(2) (1976).
38 See 1937-1 C.B. 519-32.
Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1978, at 4, col. 2.
38 The central truth, as I see it, is there simply [is] no traditional marketplace to
guide pricing for a large part of the defense and space procurement. The Navy cannot
go out in the ordinary marketplace and buy a Polaris missile. NASA cannot buy com-
mercially a Surveyor or an Apollo.
112 CONG. REc. 13289 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Mills).
Professor Peck has argued that the weapons market is not a competitive market for four
reasons: (1) the tremendous expense of weapons development precludes private financing; (2)
weapons development and production are characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty
than exists in other markets; (3) the government's desires for products are unpredictable, and
this precludes private product development; and (4) weapons are too unique to permit effec-
tive product substitution. M. PECK & F. SCHERR, THE WEAPONS AcQUsmoN PROcEsSS: AN
ECONoMic ANALsis 57-60 (1962).
Nevertheless, it is not clear that these factors preclude the existence or development of
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to several peculiarities of the defense procurement process: the fre-
netic pace and heightened demand characteristic of wartime pro-
curement that may enable contractors to extract a supracompetitive
price,"5 the complexity of defense products that may put govern-
ment negotiators at the mercy of industry cost estimates,' and the
lack of incentive of government negotiators to strike the best deal
possible."1
Implicit in the Renegotiation Act's response to this perceived
failure of the market is the assumption that profits should be the
primary measure of the magnitude of the resulting market failure.
Because efforts to recover profits of government contractors presup-
pose a concept of normal profit, critical analysis of the Renegotia-
tion Act, or any similar profit regulation scheme, requires the devel-
opment of a basis for distinguishing between "normal" and "above-
normal" profits and for identifying those above-normal profits that
should be deemed "excessive. '4 2
A. The Economic Concept
The concept of profit carries a variety of meanings.4 3 It is partic-
ularly important to distinguish between profit as the term is used
in economic theory and as it is used in accounting theory. Profit in
its accounting sense represents the excess of revenues over costs
incurred, including such noncash items as depreciation." Profit in
a competitive market for weapons. See Stigler & Friedland, Profits of Defense Contractors,
61 AM. ECON. REv. 692, 694 (1971). It should also be noted that only a small part of renego-
tiable business (although presumably all contracts subject to the Vinson-Trammel Act) is
related to weapons. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CAUSES OF ExcESSIVE PROsITS ON DEFENSE AND
SPACE CoNTRACTS 7-8 (1975).
1, See Osborn, Background and Evolution of the Renegotiation Concept, in
PocuREMENT, supra note 3, at 14-38, for an account of the effects of the wartime emergency
on government procurement during wars from the French and Indian through the Korean.
See Coggeshall, supra note 3, at 45-46.
, Government officials may lack incentives to operate efficiently. If a corporation is run
inefficiently, then it becomes an attractive target for a takeover bid. The purchaser will be
able to capitalize the gains from replacing inefficient management with more efficient man-
agement. This incentive, however, is wholly absent in the operatio- of government agencies.
See generally Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777, 787-89 (1972). It is also suggested that government
procurement officers lack the ability needed for effective negotiation. See M. PECK & F.
SCHmR, supra note 38, at 85-94.
,5 See note 48 infra.
Weston, A Generalized Uncertainty Theory of Profit, 40 AM. EcoN. Rnv. 40, 40 (1950).
See also R. Lu's v & R. STEINER, ECONOMICS 196 (1966) ("It is important to be clear about
different meanings of the term profit not only to avoid fruitless semantic arguments but also
because a theory that predicts that certain behavior is a function of profits defined one way
will not necessarily predict behavior accurately given some other definition.").
" See, e.g., J. DuE & R. CLOWER, INTERmEDIATE EcoNomic ANALYSIS 370-71 (5th ed. 1966).
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economics is defined as the excess of revenues over opportunity
costs.4 5 The difference between the economic and accounting con-
ceptions is that "the accountant does not include as costs charges
for risk-taking and use of the owners' own capital,"46 and that the
accountant uses historical rather than current market valuation of
assets.
A further distinction is sometimes drawn in economics between
"normal" and "above-normal" profit. Normal profit is defined with
respect to conditions of long-run industry equilibrium: normal prof-
its are "returns to capital and risk-taking just necessary to prevent
the owners [of the firm] from withdrawing from the industry."4
Above-normal profits,4" then, are defined as "a return on investment
in excess of that obtainable elsewhere,"49 and when above-normal
profits are zero the firm or entrepreneur is earning a normal profit.
Normal profit, thus, is equal to the imputed cost of invested capital,
adjusted for risk."
The significance of profitability, and the importance of distin-
guishing between normal and above-normal profit, lies in the rela-
tion of these concepts to the criterion of economic efficiency." Five
0 See, e.g., R. LIPsEY & P. STEINER, supra note 43, at 196; R. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM
AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 190 (4th ed. 1970) (profit equals the excess of revenue over costs;
"included as costs are obligations incurred for all resources used to what those resources could
earn employed in their next best alternative use"); cf. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 618-26 (9th
ed. 1973) (identifying six distinct conceptions of profit); Davis, The Current State of Profit
Theory, 42 AM. ECON. REv. 245, 245 (1952) ("The anarchic condition of... [profit] theory
is notorious.").
"R. LIPSEY & P.'STEINER, supra note 43, at 196. See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAw 187 (1972) ("[fln a competitive market there are no 'profits' in an economic sense.
There are accounting profits but they are just equal to the cost of attracting and retaining
capital in the business.").
" R. LipsEY & P. STMNER, supra note 43, at 196. Accord, F. VAN DEN BOGAERDE, ELEMENTS
OF PRICE THEORY 133 (1967) ("Normal profit is defined as the profit emerging in a condition
of equilibrium, which would mean that firms would not be able to improve their position by
the expedient of entering another market."). But cf. Weston, supra note 43, at 52 ("there is
no 'normal profit"') (footnote omitted); Dobb, Entrepreneur, in 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 558, 559 (1931) ("There is no normal profit, since ex hypothesi profit is
incalculable deviation of the actual from the anticipated.").
" The term "above-normal profits" will be used consistently throughout this comment
as synonymous with the other economic terms-"excess,". "pure," "economic," and "pure
economic" profit, see J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 387 (2d ed. 1968)-that have been
applied as labels for the profit concept described herein. "Above-normal profits," rather than
one of the more widely-used terms, has been adopted to distinguish more clearly such profits
from "excessive profits." "Excessive profits" are those profits that are subject to recapture
under one of the profit-recovery statutes.
" C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 272 (3d ed. 1972).
See J. BAIN, supra note 48, at 388-89.
s See id. at 393-96.
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principal reasons explain the existence of above-normal profits: 2 (1)
the firm may possess monopoly power; (2) the firm's product may
be purchased under duress;53 (3) the contractual price term may be
based upon inaccurate estimates of the costs of production; (4) the
industry may not be in long-run equilibrium; and (5) the firm may
be more efficient than other firms in the industry.' That above-
normal profits are earned by a firm does not, however, necessarily
indicate that resources are being inefficiently allocated. To deter-
mine the consequences of above-normal profits for efficient resource
allocation, it is necessary to examine in more detail each of the five
causes of above-normal profits.
1. Monopoly Power. Above-normal profits may be the result
of a firm possessing monopoly (or monopsony) power. 5 Two deleter-
ious effects on resource allocation result. First, the monopolist's
supracompetitive price leads to economic inefficiency by inducing
consumers to shift purchases to a less desirable product, decreasing
total consumer welfare. Second, the prospect of earning monopoly
profits induces firms to devote resources to acquiring and maintain-
ing a monopoly." Expenditures of this sort result in a decrease in
consumer welfare .5 Thus, application of the economic efficiency
criterion suggests that .above-normal profits resulting from monop-
oly be recaptured.
2. Duress." Duress is often defined as that which results in a
forced agreement. 0 In this comment the term will be construed
more broadly. Duress purchases produce above-normal profits in
two instances in addition to forced agreement: (1) when there is
insufficient time to determine the competitive price of a product
52 Cf. id. at 397-98 (identifying four causes of above normal profits: (1) disequilibrium
and misestimation of cost; (2) risk; (3) innovation and efficiency; and (4) monopoly or monop-
sony).
51 Duress is a violation of the competition or comprehensive knowledge (itself a condition
of competition) conditions that must be met for above-normal profits to be avoided. See
generally R. PosNER, supra note 46, at 48-49 (1972); see also G. STIcLER, THE THEORY OF PIUCE
87-89 (3d ed. 1966).
"Identifiable superior inputs that result in above-normal profits in the short-run will
be capitalized as a cost in the long run. Certain efficiencies, however, may not be attributable
to a specific input and will result in above-normal profits in the long run. See Demsetz,
Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-3 (1973).
m See C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRIcnns, PROBLMAS, AND POMCMs 570 (2d ed. 1963).
See also J. BAN supra note 48, at 398-402.
m See R. PosNER, ANTITRUsT LAw: AN EcooNouc PmspErvn 10 (1976).
" See id. at 11.
u See id.
51 Duress may be subsumed under monopoly, see R. PosNE, supra note 46, at 49, never-
theless, it is useful to refer to duress as a specific cause of excessive profits.
N BLACK'S LAw DicTIONARY 594 (4th ed. 1951).
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through a thorough market search, and (2) when there is insufficient
time to analyze producers' estimates of costs for deliberate infla-
tion.' As with monopoly, above-normal profits resulting from du-
ress indicate an economically inefficient use of resources.
3. Inaccurate Cost Estimation.2 Even where defense contrac-
tors do not deliberately overestimate costs, 3 there may be serious
difficulties in predicting the cost of production, especially where the
goods are novel or technologically complex,64 or where the volume
or rate of production is uncertain. 5 In either case, if costs are lower
than expected, above-normal profits may be earned.6 Unless the
misestimation is deliberate, such profits are not excessive from an
economic efficiency viewpoint.
If the contract is for a fixed unit price, any above-normal profit
earned may be considered a reward for the substantial risk in under-
taking a contract with unpredictable costs. Moreover, any profit
from reduction in cost is a reward for increased efficiency. 7 If the
contract is an incentive contract, in which the contractor keeps a
percentage of any cost-savings, then the additional profit is again a
61 The contractor often has a strong incentive to inflate cost estimates because the con-
tractor's profits will generally be set as a percentage of cost or estimated cost. See Smoot,
Procurement Practices and Renegotiation, in PROCUREMENT, supra note 3, at 9.
The likelihood of duress can be traced to two aspects of the government-contractor
transaction: the type of product provided and the nature of the contracting process. If a
manufacturer produces a unique or highly specialized product, he may be able, through
duress, to extract an above-normal profit. If the product is a standard commercial item,
however, price information will be widely available and the dispersion of prices will be
relatively small, see G. STiGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171,181-82 (1968): the govern-
iment will be able to exploit the competitive market without taking the time to obtain compet-
itive bids. With regard to the contracting process, if the price and terms are negotiated, the
delay and cost to the government of obtaining the information needed for optimal negotiation
may be high, and the possibility of duress cannot be dismissed. When a contract is awarded
through competitive bidding, economic theory precludes a finding of excessive profit: duress
and monopoly are incompatible with competitive bidding. See G. STIGLE, supra note 53, at
44-45.
" See J. DUE & R. CLOWER, supra note 44, at 377-78.
3 See note 61 supra.
" But only a small part of renegotiable business is technologically complex. See
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 38, at 6.
5 As the rate of production changes, so does the opportunity to exploit economies of
scale. For a discussion of the sources of economies of scale, see G. STIGLER, supra note 53, at
153-54. As the volume of production changes, holding the rate constant, the optimal tech-
nique of production changes also. Thus, changes in rate or volume of production will cause
actual costs to deviate from expected costs. See also Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in THE
ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC REsouRcEs 23 (1959).
" Of course, if the contract is for a fixed unit price, the contractor will lose money if costs
are greater than anticipated. In a competitive industry the price of the contract will compen-
sate the contractor for bearing this risk.
" See Marcus, supra note 3, at 179-80.
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prod to greater efficiency."8 Finally, if the contract is for costs plus
a percentage of cost, then the uncertainty of cost is totally removed
and no above-normal misestimation profits are possible.
4. Industry Disequilibrium!' Current market or contractual
price may be above the long-run equilibrium level because of a rapid
increase in demand or a sudden contraction of supply. Unlike the
monopoly or duress cases, the higher price represents the true social
cost of production. Only if the price is allowed to rise will the prod-
uct be consumed at its highest-use value. If the government,
through recovery of a portion of above-normal disequilibrium prof-
its, is able to purchase the product for a lower price than other
potential consumers, then those consumers-to whom the product
may be worth more-have been deprived of the product. The above-
normal disequilibrium profits are required to attract the resources
needed to bring the industry back to equilibrium." Thus, above-
normal disequilibrium profits are not, from an economic efficiency
viewpoint, excessive.
5. Differential Efficiency.71 Some firms in an industry may be
more efficient than others. Firms that are more efficient than the
least efficient firm in the industry (which, by hypothesis must make
a normal profit) will make above-normal profits, and these profits
may persist over time.72 Above-normal differential efficiency profits
are not excessive from an economic efficiency viewpoint: they do not
cause inefficient substitutions in consumption or production. They
merely indicate that there is a limited number of unusually efficient
producers and that a single price will prevail in the market.7" Above-
normal profits in this case are simply a reward for efficiency.
In summary, economic theory suggests that recovery of above-
normal profits attributable to monopoly or duress is consistent with
the goal of achieving an efficient allocation of resources. Above-
normal profits resulting from inaccurate estimation of costs, from
industry disequilibrium, or from differential efficiency are not indic-
ative of an inefficient allocation of resources and are therefore not
excessive in an economic sense.
" Id. at 180.
" See generally R. Lrrwicn, supra note 45, at 364-68; G. STioLzR, supra note 53, at 180-
82.
7, See C. MCCONNELL, supra note 55, at 83.
71 Cf. J. BAN, supra note 48, at 397 (innovations, lower-cost production techniques, and
more popular products).
7 See generally Demsetz, supra note 54.
'Id.
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B. The Statutory Concept
The Vinson-Trammell and Renegotiation Acts embody two dis-
tinct statutory definitions of excessive profit, though they do not
necessarily reflect different underlying justifications for recovery of
above-normal profit. Under the Vinson-Trammell Act, excessive
profit is simply the amount of a contractor's profit exceeding the
statutory maximum. Identification of excessive profit under the
Renegotiation Act is more complex: the Renegotiation Board, in
determining the presence or absence of excessive profits, has been
guided by the factors explicitly set forth in the Act. The Act directs
that "favorable recognition" be given to the efficiency of the con-
tractor "with particular regard to the attainment of quantity and
quality production, reduction of costs, and economy in the use of
materials, facilities, and manpower."" In addition, the Act requires
the following factors to be considered:
(1) Reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard
to volume of production, normal earnings, and comparison of war and
peacetime products;
(2) The net worth, with particular regard to the amount and
source of public and private capital employed;
(3) Extent of risk assumed, including the risk incident to rea-
sonable pricing policies;
(4) Nature and extent of contribution to the defense effort, in-
cluding inventive and developmental contribution and cooperation
with the Government and other contractors in supplying technical
assistance;
(5) Character of business, including source and nature of mate-
rials, complexity of manufacturing technique, character and extent
of subcontracting, and rate of turn-over;
(6) Such other factors the consideration of which the public
interest and fair and equitable dealing may require, which factors
shall be published in the regulations of the Board from time to time
as adopted. 5
The extent to which Congress intended to adopt the economic
justification for the recapture of excessive profits is not clear from
the legislative histories of the Vinson-Trammell and the Renegotia-
tion Acts.7" The legislative debate on the Renegotiation Act reveals
7, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1213(e) (1970).
7' Id.
7, One commentator, writing at the time of the first congressional renegotiation statute,
stated that the policies underlying renegotiation of government contracts were that "excessive
and unreasonable profits should be recaptured and that 'reasonable' profits should be allowed
in order to promote 'efficient' production of war goods." 17 TEMP. L.Q. 82, 84 (1942). See also
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.& ECON. 7 (1966).
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that its overriding purpose was to prevent "war profiteering."'77 The
question remains, however, whether war profiteering is a political or
an economic concept, or an amalgam of both. Part of the difficulty
in interpreting the legislative histories arises from the legislators'
unsophisticated and sometimes confusing use of economic con-
cepts.7 In addition, the repeated extensions of the Renegotiation
Act during peacetime, and the recent decisions of Congress to allow
the Act to expire, to cut off funds to the Renegotiation Board, and
to revitalize the Vinson-Trammell Act are frustratingly ambigu-
ous. 
79
Despite the ambiguity, it is clear that Congress intended above-
normal profits derived from monopoly or duress to be recaptured.u
It is equally clear from the explicit language of the Renegotiation
Act that Congress did not intend that above-normal profits attribut-
able to superior efficiency or innovative, cost-saving production
techniques be recaptured;"' nor did Congress intend that profits
constituting risk premiums be recaptured." In these respects the
legislative approach to above-normal profit recovery accords with
the economic interpretation. By recognizing only limited justifica-
tions for profits deemed to be above normal, however, the statutory
renegotiation approach presumptively identifies as excessive some
profits that are unobjectionable from an economic point of view.
The renegotiation approach departs from the economic model
by leaving open the possibility of finding excessive profits resulting
from misestimation of costs" or short-term industry disequili-
brium. 4 Where the demand for a product is increasing rapidly, for
example, the legislative view is apparently that this increase in
demand somehow renders the market noncompetitive, or, even if
97 CONG. REc. 581-610 (1951). The tenor of congressional debate was set by Senator
Borah in his 1934 speech demanding that Congress "take the profits out of war." 78 CONG.
Rxc. 3688-89 (1934). Borah's demand led to the enactment of the Vinson-Trammell Act. See
Note, Reform of the Renegotiation Process in Government Contracting, supra note 3, (dis-
cussing the political content of profit recovery).
18 See, e.g., 97 CONG. Rnc. 587-88 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Vinson); 112 CONG. 1En. 13289
(1966) (remarks of Rep. Mills).
'1 For example, Representative McCloskey's argument that the Renegotiation Act is no
longer economically required, 123 CONG. Rac. E1922 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1977), is inconsistent
with the reactivation of the Vinson-Trammell Act.
N See, e.g., 97 CONG. RPc. 582 (1951).
91 50 U.S.C. app. § 1213(e) (1970).
81 Id.
9 The House Report stated that the Renegotiation Act was specifically aimed at those
contracts in which accurate cost estimation was impossible. See H.R. REP. No. 7, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1951).
" See CoMPRoLm GE _a, supra note 38, at 15-16. See also Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 760 n.6, 762 n.7 (1947).
1978]
The University of Chicago Law Review
the market is assumed to be competitive, that above-normal profits
should be treated as excessive because of the disequilibrium. The
legislative decision to recover above-normal profits attributable to
both disequilibrium and misestimation of costs reflects a use of the
concept of duress in its looser, noneconomic sense: the government,
because of the exigencies of war, is at a perceived bargaining disad-
vantage, and defense contractors should not be able to profit from
the unfavorable conditions under which the government must pro-
cure its defense goods."
The approach of the Vinson-Trammell Act diverges even more
significantly from the economic argument for recovery of above-
normal profits. The Act applies an arbitrary and simplistic test to
identify excessive profits: a profit rate in excess of the statutory
maximum gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption that the con-
tractor has earned an excessive profit; a profit rate below the statu-
tory ceiling is irrebuttable proof that the profit earned is not exces-
sive, even though the criterion of economic efficiency might indicate
that recovery of the above-normal profit is appropriate.
IH. THE IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF EXCESSIVE PROFITS
A. An Overview
The task of identifying and measuring excessive profits is diffi-
cult regardless of whether an economic or a statutory approach is
adopted. 6 Both approaches suggest that the identification and mea-
surement procedures should be causally based. Under such an ap-
proach, each firm's profits would be subjected to scrutiny; if the
firm's profits arose from impermissible sources (monopoly or duress
under the economic approach; monopoly, duress, misestimation,
or short-run disequilibrium under the Renegotiation Act approach),
then the firm's profits should be recaptured. Yet such an approach
would be impossible to implement and administer due to the nature
of the required causal inquiry." The only feasible approach is a
system of presumptions based upon statistical norms.
The basic datum in such a system is the firm's accounting
See James, Renegotiation-An Answer and Its Problems, 11 U. Cm. L. Rv. 204 (1944).
In essence, renegotiation, like the conscription of men into the armed forces, is a tax on a
specific group. See Oi, The Economics of the Draft, 57-2 AM. ECON. Rv. 39 (1967).
" See, e.g., Gillette, Accounting Aspects of Renegotiation, in PaocuRnmNT, supra note
3, at 109.
" Cf. R. PosNnR, supra note 56, at 55-71 (identifying 12 conditions that are favorable to
collusion). But cf. Steiner, Book Review, 44 U. Cm. L. Rhv. 873, 888 (1977) (questioning the
empirical applicability of the factors identified by Posner).
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profit-a dollar amount.8 This accounting profit must be trans-
formed into a form amenable to comparative evaluation." Theory
suggests that the proper basis for comparison is the ratio of account-
ing profits-to-invested capital. In certain situations, however, this
ratio will not be meaningful;' 1 in such situations the ratio of ac-
counting profits-to-net sales may serve as a satisfactory proxy.'2
Once firms' profits have been converted into ratio form, a
"filter level" must be set' 3 If the firm's profit ratio is below the filter
level, then an irrebuttable presumption arises that the firm has not
earned any above-normal profits. If the firm's profit ratio is at or
above the filter level, then the firm's profits must be subjected to
further analysis, the purpose of which is to determine whether the
firm's above-normal profits are explainable as arising from unobjec-
tionable sources (e.g., superior efficiency). If, after the analysis, the
firm's profit ratio is still supranormal, then the presumption arises
that the firm has earned excessive profits that ought to be recap-
tured.
B. The Renegotiation Approach
The determination and recapture of excessive profits by the
Renegotiation Board is based upon an application of statutory fac-
tors. 4 The Renegotiation Board, however, refused to assign explicit
weights to these statutory factors. 5 More significantly, for years the
Board refused to make "public either its decisions in individual
" See Camel Mfg. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 280, 285 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
"See id.
"See F. SCHER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRuCruRE AND EcoNoMic PmoRRMAcE 80 (1970)
("Using profits as a percentage of net worth or stockholders' equity best satisfies the assump-
tions of economic theory"). This is because the firm, at least in theory, seeks to maximize
the shareholders' net worth. See E. SOLOMON, THE THEORY OF FINANciAL MANAGEMENT 22-25
(1963); J. VAN HORNE, FiNANCiAL MANAGEMENT AND PoLicY 8-9 (2d ed. 1971).
," When, for example, a contractor provides just management services, see text at notes
137-144, invested capital is approximately zero, and other normative rules govern behavior.
The contractor providing management services will seek to maximize his net income. See E.
SOLOMON, supra note 90, at 24-25.
In other cases, valuation of a firm's net worth or invested capital may present grave
difficulties. This is likely when goodwill and other intangibles are not recorded on the firm's
balance sheet, when asset valuation-including valuation of intangibles-is at historical cost
significantly below current market value, or when a contractor has both covered and noncov-
ered contracts, requiring an allocation of capital employed.
12 Cf. F. SCHERm, supra note 90, at 80 ("Profits as a percentage of sales is clearly
deficient").
,1 This level must be set to balance the risk of "approving" contracts that have, in fact,
generated above-normal profits against the cost of needlessly analyzing contracts that have
generated no above-normal profits.
" See text and notes at notes 74-75 supra.
0 Marcus, supra note 3, at 40 (1963).
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cases or the reasons underlying them." 6 As a result it has been
difficult for anyone, including Congress, to evaluate the fairness and
consistency with which the Board has made its determinations of
excessive profit and the extent to which it has adhered to the poli-
cies underlying the Act." Although the Renegotiation Board's non-
disclosure policy makes evaluation of the Board's methodology diffi-
cult, it is possible to assess the approach that the courts have taken
to the recapture of above-normal profits under the Renegotiation
Act.
Jurisdiction of de novo review of the Renegotiation Board's ex-
cessive profit determinations was, prior to 1971, vested in the Tax
Court.6 In 1971 jurisdiction was transferred to the Court of Claims.99
1. The Tax Court Cases. The early Tax Court opinions were
characterized by a vague, ill-defined approach to the determination
of excessive profits.6 0 The court rarely overturned determinations of
the Renegotiation Board, and the court's opinions do not indicate
the focus of the court's analysis or the weight it accorded the statu-
tory factors. 10'
Vaughan Machinery Co. v. Renegotiation Board'°2 marked a
shift from the Tax Court's unstructured approach. In Vaughan, the
court used the ratio of accounting profits-to-sales as the primary
index of comparative profitability and considered the statutory fac-
tors as possible justifications for deviation from the normal rate of
return.' 3 The next shift by the court was dictated by the character-
istics of the firms involved in the renegotiation process. In a series
of four cases involving production of aircraft and aircraft compo-
nents, the contractors had relied heavily on government-provided
0, Id. at 41. This was changed somewhat by the decision in Grumman Aircrift Eng'r
Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that the Renegotiation
Board, subject to FOIA exemptions, must disclose its orders and opinions to contractors). Cf.
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) (denying injunctive relief
to obtain such information).
11 Marcus, supra note 3, at 24.
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 1218 (1970).
Act of July 1, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-41, § 3(a), 85 Stat. 98 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 1218 (Supp. V 1975)). The transfer has been described as a coin flip which the Court of
Claims lost. Gallagher, Renegotiation at the Court of Claims: The Government's Struggle
With the Burden of Proof, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 376, 376 n.3 (1978).
'0 See, e.g., Waltham Screw Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 31 T.C. 227 (1958); Edell v.
United States, 28 T.C. 601 (1957); Stoner Mfg. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 21 T.C. 200 (1953).
"I The Tax Court, during its period of jurisdiction, upheld 88.7 percent of the total
amount of excessive profits as determined by the Renegotiation Board. 16 RmEmaorIArnoN BD.
ANN. REP. 15 (1971).
1- 30 T.C. 949 (1958).
03 Id. at 959-60.
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assets. ' In Boeing v. Renegotiation Board,1"I for example, the court
held the accounting profits-to-sales ratio inapplicable in situations
involving extensive use of government facilities and equipment.1"
Focusing on the real investment of the firm, the Boeing court se-
lected the accounting profits-to-invested capital ratio as the proper
index of profitability. 10 These aircraft cases represent the only at-
tempt by the court to make such use of the ratio of accounting
profits-to-invested capital. Major changes in analysis did not occur
until the transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims.
2. The Court of Claims Cases. The renegotiation decisions of
the Court of Claims differ from those of the Tax Court in three
important respects: first, the ultimate burden of proof has shifted
from the contractor to the government; second, the use of compara-
tive profit ratios has become more sophisticated; and third, the
treatment of the statutory factors has grown more explicit and
quantitative.10 s
In Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. United States,"' the Court of
Claims reexamined the allocation of burden of proof in de novo
judicial proceedings. The court held that the contractor has the
burden of introducing proof of the accuracy of its data with respect
to its finances and the statutory factors upon which it relies, but
that the burden of persuasion is on the government."' The impact
of the Lykes decision on the government's ability to establish the
amount of excessive profits in subsequent Court of Claims cases has
been considerable."
I", LTV Aerospace Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 51 T.C. 369 (1968); Offner Prods. Corp.
v. Renegotiation Bd., 50 T.C. 856 (1968); North Am. Aviation v. Renegotiation Bd., 39 T.C.
207 (1962); Boeing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 37 T.C. 613, appeal dismissed 325 F.2d 888 (9th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964).
1" 37 T.C. 613, appeal dismissed 325 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923
(1964).
," Id. at 644.
117 Id.
10 The effect of these changes on case results has been striking. In contrast to the Tax
Court's record of upholding or increasing the Renegotiation Board's excessive profit determi-
nations in the vast majority of cases, see note 101 supra, the Court of Claims has usually
decreased or cut entirely the Board's excessive profits determinations in Renegotiation Act
cases. See, e.g., Manufacturers Serv. Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 561 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Camel
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 280 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Mills Mfg. Corp. v. United States,
571 F.2d 1162 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1113 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
Gibraltar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 386 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Butkin Precision Mfg.
Corp. v. United States, 544 F.2d 499 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Major Coat Co. v. United States, 543
F.2d 97 (Ct. Cl. 1976); A.C. Ball Co. v. United States, 531 F.2d 993 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Mason &
Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1341 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
'" 459 F.2d 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
" Id. at 1399.
' Compare Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1113, 1124 (Ct. Cl. 1977), and
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The second major difference between the Tax Court and the
Court of Claims decisions is that the Court of Claims clearly focuses
on the profit ratio at the start of its analysis. The Court of Claims
has adopted two approaches to the use of profit ratios. In some cases
the court has used profit ratios to construct a range of permissible,
nonexcessive profits and then applied the statutory factors to deter-
mine the proper location of the contractor in the "profit hier-
archy. 112 In other cases the court has begun with what it deter-
mined to be a reasonable rate of return and then has made appropri-
ate adjustments to take into account the statutory factors.'
These approaches differ in that the "profit hierarchy" approach
is more likely to reward risk-taking, since it emphasizes the disper-
sion rather than the mean of profits. It is the preferred approach
when the court has sufficient information about the characteristics
of the firms being used as the bases of comparison to make the profit
hierarchy meaningful. It is important to stress that the contractor
need not fall within the profit hierarchy; if the contractor is more
efficient or assumes more risk than the other contractors, the reten-
tion of above-normal profits may promote an efficient allocation of
resources.' 4
The third major difference between the Tax Court and Court
of Claims approaches is their treatment of the statutory factors."5
Major Coat Co. v. United States1 and its progeny 7 exemplify the
Gibraltar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 386, 394 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (court noted
"scantiness" of the record and allowed a determination of excessive profits only because of
the comparative novelty of trials under the burden of proof rules) with Major Coat Co. v.
United States, 543 F.2d 97, 111 (Ct. Cl. 1976), and A.C. Ball Co. v. United States, 531 F.2d
993, 1016-17 (Ct. Cl. 1976). For discussions of the impact of the transfer of jurisdiction to the
Court of Claims, see Gallagher, supra note 99; Yannello, Judicial Proceedings in Renegotia-
tion Act Cases, 24 Am. U.L. Rav. 339 (1975).
2 See, e.g., Major Coat Co. v. United States, 543 F.2d 97, 102, 111 (Ct. Cl. 1976); A.C.
Ball Co. v. United States, 531 F.2d 993, 1016-17 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason
Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1341, 1364-65 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
The phrase "profit hierarchy" is traceable to Marcus, supra note 3, at 47. The courts have
since adopted his language. See, e.g., Aero Spacelines, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 324,
340 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
"1 See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1113, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
Gibraltar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 386, 388, 391 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Butkin Precision
Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 544 F.2d 499, 505-06 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
"I' See, e.g., Camel Mfg. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 280, 285 (Ct. Cl. 1978) ("High
profits may not be 'excessive' profits if they are justified by a statutory factor.").
"I See, e.g., A.C. Ball Co. v. United States, 531 F.2d 993, 1007-10 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (discuss-
ing risk); Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1113 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (discussing reasonable-
ness of costs and profits).
"' 543 F.2d 97 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
17 E.g., Page-River-Curran v. United States, 574 F.2d 1063 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Camel Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 280 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d
1113 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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Court of Claims's explicit and quantitative handling of the Renego-
tiation Act's statutory factors. In Major Coat the court divided the
factors into two groups. First, it considered the character of the
business, its net worth, and the capital employed,118 in order to
identify those firms (including the contractor itself) that were suffi-
ciently similar to the contractor to allow construction of a profit
hierarchy."' Second, the court considered the contractor's effi-
ciency, risks assumed, and contribution to the defense effort, 10 in
order to determine where in the hierarchy the contractor properly
belonged. 121
IV. A PROPOSED REFINEMENT OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS APPROACH
A. Reference Frames for Determining Profitability
The Court of Claims, although recognizing a role for the profit-
to-net worth and profit-to-invested capital ratios,'2 has consistently
employed the ratio of profit-to-sales as the basis for its analysis of
above-normal profits. 12s Primary reliance on the profit-to-sales ratio
may, in special circumstances, be justified. 2 In general, however,
the profit-to-invested capital ratio provides the more appropriate
basis for analysis:lss reliance on a profit-to-sales ratio may give re-
sults that are completely inconsistent with efficient allocation of
resources.
Consider two firms, producing identical products, both fi-
nanced solely with equity capital. The product of the first firm is
produced on outdated, relatively inefficient machinery. The firm
sells $1 million of product and has a profit of $10,000. Thus, its
profit-to-sales ratio is 1 percent. The second firm, however, employs
119 The court also recognized that the statute required consideration of the
"reasonableness" of the firm's costs and profits, but noted that this factor "is more concerned
with the assessment of relative efficiency," 543 F.2d at 110 n.3, and considered it at the second
stage of its inquiry.
"I The firms comparable to Major Coat ranged in profitability from 9.5 to 13.2 percent
of sales. Id. at 122.
1" Although the court purported to treat this factor as distinct, closer examination re-
veals that the court was really evaluating the efficiency of and risk assumed by the firm. Id.
at 119-20.
" The court decided that Major Coat should be viewed as one of the most efficient
producers in its industry because the government failed to carry its burden of proof that the
contrary might be true. Id. at 117. The company's assumption of business risks was deemed
"insubstantial," id. at 118, even though it endangered its relations with regular customers in
order to undertake the government business.
In See, e.g., Mills Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 571 F.2d 1162, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
' See cases cited in note 108 supra.
" See text and notes at notes 91-92 supra.
"" See note 90 supra.
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the most modern machinery and also sells $1 million of product. Its
profit is $200,000; its profit-to-sales ratio is 20 percent.
Under the Court of Claims approach, it is likely that a portion
of the second firm's $200,000 profit would be recaptured even if
"credit" were to be given to the second firm for its superior effi-
ciency. Yet, this may be totally inapposite. Suppose that the first
firm has only $100,000 of invested capital committed to the project,
while the second firm has $2 million of invested capital committed.
Under such circumstances the ratio of profit-to-invested capital for
both firms is 10 percent. The second firm's absolute dollar profit is
higher because it includes a return on the larger amount of equity
capital that the second firm has committed to the project. For ex-
cessive-profit purposes, therefore, both firms should be treated
alike-not, as the profit-to-sales ratio would suggest, differently.
The analysis may also be improved by recognizing the limita-
tions of fiscal year analysis. Determination of excessive profit nor-
mally proceeds on the basis of the profits and losses of a single fiscal
year.126 This permits a contractor to offset losses or low profits on
one covered contract against high profits on another, eliminates the
need for allocating costs among different contracts, and simplifies
administration. 12 It may, however, seriously distort analysis of a
firm's profits when the firm has a small number of covered contracts
of greater than a year's duration. Often the low profits of early years,
caused by the need for tooling-up and gaining experience, are com-
pensated for by higher profits in later years."' The courts have, on
occasion, taken note of such situations informally; 29 they should do
so explicitly when appropriate. 3 '
Once the proper index of profitability and time frame have been
chosen, the Major Coat framework requires that the firm's business
be examined to determine which industry, if any, should be used as
a frame of reference to establish the initial estimate of normal prof-
itability. This estimate is then modified by considering the statu-
In 32 C.F.R. § 1457.1 (1977). The Renegotiation Act permits accounting under some
other period, by mutual agreement of the contractor and the Board, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1215(a)
(1970). The regulations, however, permit deviation from the fiscal year basis only to allow a
limited loss carryforward. 32 C.F.R. § 1457.9 (1977). Despite the fiscal year basis, the Board
will consider deficient profits in a prior year where those deficiencies result from nonrecurring
costs in early stages of production. Id. § 1460.10(b)(5).
I" See id. § 1457.1(b).
In See generally Nichols, supra note 3. An example is Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States,
556 F.2d 1113 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
In See, e.g., Blue Bell, 556 F.2d at 1123; Gibraltar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d
386, 388 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
I3 See Nichols, supra note 3.
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tory factors-extent of risk assumed and source of capital-to deter-
mine the normal level of profitability, adjusted for risk. Finally,
reasonableness of costs is considered relative to other producers in
the relevant industry to determine how much, if any, of the above-
normal profits may be justified by efficiency considerations.131 This
process is not difficult if an identifiable competitive industry exists.
Where the product is unique or highly specialized, however, it may
be difficult to decide which firms to compare with the contractor;
the less similar are the firms selected for comparison, the less useful
the framework will be. Only when properly comparable firms have
been identified can the profit ratios be meaningfully compared."'2
B. Profit Analysis in Specific Contexts
The Renegotiation Act applies to a broad range of contracts
entered into by companies of diverse size, capital structure, and
efficiency. The operation of the proposed refinements in the process
of identifying and measuring excessive profits can best be demon-
strated by examining some of the particular problems that recur in
these diverse contexts.
1. Contracts for Novel Goods. Many government purchases of
defense and space equipment have no counterpart in the private
sector. This creates difficulties for excessive-profits analysis since
there are no firms sufficiently similar in size, character of business,
risk assumption, or contribution to the defense effort to make a
comparison meaningful. In Aero Spacelines, Inc. v. United States, 13
for example, the court recognized the necessity of comparing Aero
Spacelines, the builder of the "Pregnant" and "Super"
"Guppies"-unique forms of transportation-for NASA, with other
firms, either in the more conventional air transportation industry or
in the airframe industry.134
The great danger in such comparisons is that the contractor's
assumption of risk and introduction of innovations may not be fully
recognized. In Aero Spacelines, for example, the "Guppies" were
developed at the risk and expense of the contractor.13 If Aero Space-
131 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1213(e) (1970); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1460.10(b)(3), 1460.10(b)(4),
1460.12, 1460.13(b)(1)-(7) (1977).
I" Profit ratios may be compared within each of four sets of data: firms in the contrac-
tor's industry, government contractors in the contractor's industry, profit record of the con-
tractor on nonrenegotiable business, and profit record of the contractor on prior renegotiable
business.
1- 530 F.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
M' Id. at 340-41, 351.
Iw Id. at 341-42.
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lines were compared with other, more conventional firms, it seems
likely that the amount of excessive profits-if any-earned by Aero
Spacelines would be overstated."6 The result is the creation of unde-
sirable incentives against assuming risk and against introducing
innovations. The Aero Spacelines case exemplifies the type of situa-
tion in which the court must be sensitive to all the statutory factors
to avoid reaching a result contrary to efficient defense production.
2. Purchase of Management Services. When the government
leases to the contractor most or all of the facilities and equipment
necessary for the contract, special problems are posed in determin-
ing whether the contractor has earned excessive profits. In effect,
such contracts are purchases of management services: 37 the con-
tractor invests little or no capital of his own. 13 8 Normally the price
clause of such a contract is negotiated rather than set through com-
petitive bidding. A cost-plus feature may be necessary because the
project requirements cannot be described precisely at the time of
contracting.
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. United States3 ' is illustra-
tive. The contractor, a manufacturer of ammunition, operated four
government-owned factories on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis.' During
the early years of the Vietnam War, demand and production in-
creased substantially. Unit cost declined because of economies of
scale and effective cost control achieved by the contractor. Accord-
ingly, the profit-to-sales ratio rose from 1.66 percent in 1965 to 2.37
percent in 1967.41 It is plausible to suggest that excessive profits
were earned, and that the source was either the lack of competitive
bidding or the unanticipated increase in volume of production and
concomitant reduction in unit costs.
The Court of Claims calculated the reasonable profit figure by
averaging the 1965, pre-Vietnam War profit ratio with the adjusted,
post-renegotiation, average profit-to-sales ratio of other operators of
government-owned ammunition factories.' The court's methodol-
ogy is analytically unsound: the court simply averaged two incom-
'I, In Aero Spacelines itself, however, the court was not faced with these problems be-
cause the government submitted insufficient evidence to make a case for excessive profits.
Id. at 340-41, 357, 367.
I See 32 C.F.R. § 1460.11(b)(4) (1977).
"' See, e.g., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1341, 1357 (Ct.
Cl. 1975) (home office and $40,000 working capital).
In, Id.
"' Id. at 1344.
' Id. at 1360.
"' Id. at 1365.
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mensurable profit ratios, without regard to comparative efficiency
or defense contribution.
The court should have employed the comparative statutory fac-
tors before choosing between the two average profit ratios and at-
tempted to evaluate the usefulness of both before undertaking to
average them. The contractor's rate of profit in a supposedly
"normal" year was treated as a maximum, despite evidence that the
contractor's ingenuity had been responsible for cost savings in sub-
sequent years."' Gains from economies of scale were credited largely
to the government, even though it is arguable that an ammunition
manufacturer deliberately accepts low profits in peacetime in order
to be able to expand production when war demands it." Rather
than treat the 1.66 percent as a maximum, therefore, the court
should have adjusted the profit ratio upward to account for in-
creases in efficiency and in contribution to the defense effort, and
in recognition of the fact that lower profits in peacetime might have
reflected the costs of maintaining the capacity for greater produc-
tion in war.
Similarly, the court erred in its treatment of the 2.7 percent
average profit-to-sales ratio of government-owned facility operators.
The court should have focused on the range of profits earned by such
operators, from 1.7 to 6.7 percent, rather than on the mean. The
court should then have considered the efficiency and contribution
to the defense effort of Mason & Hangar relative to other firms to
determine where in the profit hierarchy Mason & Hangar belonged.
There is no a priori reason to assume Mason & Hangar to be the
"average" firm.
3. Firms with Few Government Contracts. When a firm has
few covered government contracts, its yearly profit rate will be, in
effect, a contractual profit rate. Since firms will assume more risk
on an individual contract than they will on their business as a
whole, the dispersion of profits on individual contracts is likely to
be far greater than the dispersion of profitability among firms. " I To
compare a one-contract firm's profits with the profits earned by
multicontract firms would deny the one-contract firm the full bene-
fit of its risk-taking.
Courts might deal with this problem in one of three ways."'
"I Id. at 1352-54. For example, a new engineering technique resulted in savings of
$275,700 at one plant in 1967. Id. at 1353.
"I The court rejected Mason & Hanger's argument that the ammunition industry is
"cyclical," experiencing low profits in peacetime, high profits in wartime. Id. at 1361.
'" See W. SHARPE, PoRrrouo THEORY AND CAPrrAL MARuTS 45-73 (1970).
'"The court has apparently not faced this issue, although it may have been an underly-
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First, they could give particular weight to a comparison of the con-
tractor with other firms with a small number of covered contracts,
eliminating the disparity in risk. Second, they could take the greater
risk of the small number of contracts into account when locating the
contractor within the profit hierarchy. Third, they could use a
longer period than the fiscal year for the accounting period, allowing
the contractor to offset low profits in some years against high profits
in other years.
4. Firms That Subcontract Much of Their Work. The treat-
ment of general contractors who employ subcontractors has been a
source of confusion in the Renegotiation Act cases." 7 The regula-
tions somewhat inconsistently provide that "favorable recognition"
be given firms that subcontract with small business concerns, but
that a contractor who subcontracts work "may not reasonably ex-
pect" as high a profit as a contractor who does the work himself.14
Presumably, the argument is that one who subcontracts makes less
of a contribution to the defense effort, employs less capital, and
shows less efficiency than the integrated manufacturer. Accord-
ingly, in Boeing Co. v. Renegotiation Board,4 ' the Renegotiation
Board relied heavily on Boeing's use of subcontractors in finding
excessive profits. 5 '
Yet, subcontracting should not be discouraged by excessive-
profits analysis. A firm will, in theory, subcontract work when it is
efficient to do so-that is, when it will make a higher profit by doing
so. 151 To take away these profits on a theory that the general contrac-
tor makes a smaller contribution to the defense effort is counter-
productive. Efficient subcontracting is as vital a function as effi-
cient manufacturing. When the profit-to-invested capital ratio is
employed in the analysis of excessive profit, the firm that subcon-
tracts much of its work will make a smaller absolute dollar profit;
yet, there is no reason why it should make a smaller percentage
profit.
CONCLUSION
For most of this century it has been the policy of the federal
ing problem in Major Coat .Co. v. United States, 543 F.2d 97 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
HI See Marschalk, Small Business Experience with Renegotiation, in PRocuREmE,
supra note 3, 72-77.
US 32 C.F.R. § 1460.14(b)(i) (1977).
u 37 T.C. 613, appeal dismissed 325 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923
(1964).
I Marschalk, sipra note 147, at 72.
"' Id. at 75.
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government to attempt to recapture excessive profits from certain
defense contractors, without imparing efficient production. This
comment has examined, from an economic perspective, the causes
of above-normal profits in the defense industry in order to deter-
mine the circumstances in which they should be considered exces-
sive. Adoption of efficient allocation of resources as an evaluative
criterion leads to the conclusion that only those above-normal prof-
its attributable to monopoly or duress should be considered exces-
sive. Examination of the legislative history of the Renegotiation Act
suggests Congress intended that all above-normal profits except
those attributable to superior efficiency be recaptured; the Vinson-
Trammell Act recaptures all profits above the statutory maxima,
regardless of their cause. Although the legislative histories of the
two Acts purport to serve the goal of efficient production of defense
products, the definitions of excessive profit in the Acts, as construed
by the courts, are not consistent with those suggested by economic
analysis. It is unclear, however, whether these statutory and judicial
departures from the economic view reflect a noneconomic legisla-
tive purpose or merely insufficient congressional knowledge of eco-
nomic theory to articulate and implement a policy promoting eco-
nomic efficiency.
Whatever the policy that statutory profit recovery is designed
to serve, the task of measuring profits and determining the extent
to which they are excessive remains. Judicial determination of ex-
cessive profits has improved considerably since jurisdiction of rene-
gotiation cases was transferred to the Court of Claims. This com-
ment has suggested further refinements in the process of measuring
excessive profits and has applied this refined approach to a variety
of particular cases.
Statutory profit recovery is currently at a crossroads. As a result
of the termination of funding for the Renegotiation Board and the
failure of Congress to extend or replace the Renegotiation Act, the
legislative approach with the least theoretical merit-the imposi-
tion of profit ceilings under the Vinson-Trammell Act-has become
the current law of excessive-profit recovery. Whether Congress
chooses to amend the Vinson-Trammell Act, reinstate the Renego-
tiation Act, enact a new excessive-profit statute, or abolish profit
recovery entirely, careful consideration should be given to the
causes of above-normal profits and the economic consequences of
recapturing those above-normal profits deemed excessive.
Eric M. Zolt
Jeffrey I. Berkowitz
1978]
